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Abstract 
The German copyright law was reformed in the end of 2016 with the purpose of 
ensuring reasonable pecuniary compensation to authors. It proposes an option 
which entitles authors to negotiate copyright transfers with an additional publisher 
after a vesting period of ten years. The results of a two-stage bargaining model 
show that the proposed copyright system may actually harm authors, as publishers 
may internalize a potential impairment on profits from increased competition 
within contract negotiations. This paper also demonstrates that the publisher's 
willingness to invest into an author's career is strictly decreasing as the level of 
expected rivalry increases. 
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1. Introduction 
In the end of 2016 the German copyright law was amended, granting authors more 
individual rights. The major goal of the legislators was to increase the chance of 
"fair agreements", with the explicit intention of improving the financial situation 
of authors (BMJV 2016). The deficiencies of the previous copyright system are 
identified as follows: first, asymmetric market power forces authors to 
permanently sell the rights to their creations in perpetuity for an inappropriately 
low lump sum (called "Total Buy-Outs"), and second, weak bargaining power 
deters authors from using legal means to force appropriate remuneration since 
publishers may de facto boycott several authors in the future (called 
"Blacklisting") (German Bundestag 2016). 
The policy makers target the new copyright system as an artificial remedy against 
these concerns. The new system inalienably entitles authors with the option to 
transfer the rights of usage of their creation to another publisher after a vesting 
period of ten years.
1
 A publisher who purchased the exclusive rights of usage 
initially may continue producing, however, forfeits the exclusivity claim (BMJV 
2016; German Bundestag 2016). A second publisher may then produce 
concurrently with the initial publisher. 
History has already shown that the attempts of law makers to redistribute 
resources to disadvantaged parties do not always align with initial intentions. In 
many cases the results have the opposite effect, and parties which should benefit 
suffer due to the other market players adapting their expectations. During contract 
negotiations, a publisher will consider the expected future profits of the creation, 
and share this expected surplus with the author
2
 (Caves 2003). Thus, the author's 
remuneration is contingent on the publisher's view of the profitability of the 
product (Towse 1999). Caves (2003) states that an author may exchange decision 
rights for pecuniary compensations. The new law may give rise to such an 
exchange: a unilateral option to terminate the exclusivity of copyright transfer 
may burden the expected profitability due to an increase in competition after ten 
                                                          
1
 To simplify matters we summarize all types of intermediaries or licensees from the music 
industry, print media industry, movie industry, software sector, etc. to the term "publisher". 
2
 This assumption can be extended to examples where publishers negotiate with delegates of 
authors or author unions. Without loss of generality, we consider direct negotiations here. 
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years, which may be reflected in a lower-paying initial contract. An additional 
contract could of course regain some of the reduced compensation. It is however 
questionable whether this artificial shift of authors' remunerations to the future 
may really increase their lifetime incomes because a second contract would 
internalize the competitive situation as well. 
Such unintended effects may result in serious consequences for the creative 
industries and cultural consumption (Koboldt 1995; Liebowitz & Watt 2006). 
Although authors are generally intrinsically motivated to produce creative works, 
and tend to prefer a broad distribution of their creations, it is evident that the more 
outside parties exploit authors' works, the less incentive there is for authors to 
create (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Since publishers require valid products to 
satisfy consumer demand, a copyright system requires incentive-compatible 
contracts to adequately induce the creation of valid products (Landes & Posner 
1989; Koboldt 1995; Liebowitz & Margolis 2005). Without these incentives, a 
creative industry is sustainable to a limited degree, or not sustainable at all 
(Shavell & Van Ypersele 2001; Towse 2002; Liebowitz & Margolis 2005; 
Liebowitz & Watt 2006). Thus, unsuccessful attempts to compensate authors 
more appropriately may decrease authors' incentives to produce creative works 
and result in an insufficient supply for a market with a very high demand (Caves 
2000; Liebowitz & Margolis 2005; Liebowitz & Watt 2006). 
There exists a vast body of literature dealing with the optimal degree of copyright 
protection with respect to the incentive-access paradigm. However, there is a clear 
gap in the literature when it comes to using economic theory to explain the effects 
of changes in copyright structure or copyright law on the interaction between 
authors and publishers (Kretschmer et al. 2010). 
To the best of our knowledge, the paper by Michel (2006) is the only related 
contribution which takes up the author-publisher relationship in a bargaining 
model. In his model, a copyrighted good may be bought or copied by consumers, 
and the transaction costs for copying determine their preference relation between 
buying and copying. Michel demonstrates how variations in transaction costs 
affect the authors' profit share, determined in the initial contract negotiations with 
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publishers. Richard Watt (in Kretschmer et al. 2010) re-interprets Michel's model 
in a very sensible manner by transferring the transaction costs argument to a 
copyright system approach. He states that high transaction costs may be 
equivalent to a strict copyright system because this would increase the necessity to 
rely on the protected good. Due to Watt, a stricter copyright system would then 
increase market prices and consequently the remuneration of authors. 
Watt's "reading between the lines" approach helps us to position the case at hand 
within the existing literature. Watt concludes that copyright law itself (or a change 
of the copyright system) may only have an indirect effect on the author-publisher 
relationship because, in the first instance, it relates to consumer's rights. However, 
both the model by Michel and our model clearly show that copyright law has an 
indirect impact on the interrelation between authors and publishers. This is 
because the publisher-consumer relationship determines the extent of the joint 
surplus resulting from the author-publisher cooperation, which is essential in 
defining contractual terms. 
Our framework adopts the model by Michel (2006) insofar that a change of the 
copyright system affects the negotiations over the joint surplus in the initial 
contract. However in contrast to Michel, the change of system is not induced by 
different product preferences, but by considering competition effects between 
publishers. Therefore we compare a previous copyright system under which there 
only exists one publisher with a new system where authors may allow another 
publisher to enter the market. Based on the argumentation of Watt (in Kretschmer 
et al. 2010), we interpret the new system as an indirect decrease of copyright 
scope because, as we will demonstrate, the consumers will face lower prices and 
the distribution of the creation will increase. In other words, consumers will have 
easier access to creations under the proposed copyright system. 
There exists literature with respect to the termination right under U.S. Copyright 
Law (17 U.S.C. §203) which offers additional views of experts about the effects 
of authors' individual rights on the author-publisher relationship. This right 
entitles authors to terminate their contracts with publishers after a certain vesting 
period. Although the problem of this paper differs structurally, both copyright 
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systems are related because a unilateral decision of authors after contract may 
affect the cooperation rent. Thus, publishers, being in the stronger position and 
attempting to get the most out of their investment, may adjust their expectations 
and offer worse deals to authors (Rub 2013; Brown 2014; Darling 2015; Karas & 
Kirstein 2017). 
Section 2 introduces the assumptions of our model. Section 3 introduces the 
details and the optimal solutions of the benchmark system, and section 4 does the 
same for the reform system. The solutions are juxtaposed in section 5 to compare 
investment incentives, author's lifetime income, and social welfare effects. Section 
6 discusses the findings before the paper concludes in section 7. 
 
2. The model 
Before analyzing the two systems separately, we explain the assumptions which 
are relevant for both regimes. We formally describe two copyright systems: the 
benchmark system (BS) and the reform system (RS). In both systems there are two 
periods and two players: an author
3
 (denoted A) who owns a creation, and a 
publisher (denoted P) who bargains in period one over the license to distribute the 
creation in both periods. In the RS, an additional player, publisher Q, may be 
present in period two and bargain with A over the same license. If A and Q come 
to an agreement, Q distributes concurrently with P in period two. For simplicity, 
we assume both publishers to have equal cost structures and all players to be 
perfectly informed. 
Assume A is risk averse and let both publishers be risk-neutral.
4
 A is interested in 
maximizing the lifetime income for her creation
5
, and the two publishers wish to 
maximize their profits. Let l(α) be the remuneration agreed with P in the BS, and 
let 0<α<1 denote A's bargaining power in period one. In addition, m(α) denotes 
the remuneration by P and n(β) the remuneration by Q in the RS, where 0<β<1 
                                                          
3
 This simplifying assumption may be extended to a collective of authors or a delegate which 
negotiates on behalf of authors. As we believe, this simplification has no impact on our results 
because the starting position is equal in both systems. 
4
 It is often observed that authors are at least "more" risk averse than publishers because they 
generally have few alternatives, whereas publishers are broadly diversified (Towse 2006).  
5
 We put aside all intrinsic motivations of  the author (e.g. fame, reputation, etc.) since we are 
solely interested in the analysis of the financial situation of authors. 
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indicates A's bargaining power in period two. l(α), m(α) and n(β) define the source 
of conflict and are contractible in the respective period. Finally, assume each 
remuneration to be the only payment to A for her creation in the respective 
period.
6
 
The payments result from the two person bargaining situations, modeled here with 
the asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. This concept requires individual 
rationality and Pareto efficiency (Nash 1950; Binmore et al. 1986), both of which 
are satisfied if a player's payoff (or as we will discuss later the "expected payoff") 
exceeds her outside option in the respective negotiation stage. Even though Pareto 
efficiency is fulfilled, there exists a source of conflict regarding the compensation 
of A, namely that the lifetime income maximizing desire of A has a contrary 
effect on the profits of P or Q, and vice versa. However, an added profit through 
agreement now exists since only then is a publisher obliged to distribute to the 
market. Note that since there is no asymmetric information in our model, each 
bargaining result will perfectly reflect the players' expectations about future 
payoffs (Rubinstein & Wolinsky 1985; Binmore et al. 1986). 
 
3. Benchmark system 
3.1 Set-up 
A detailed sequence of events for the benchmark system BS7 is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The game starts with the negotiations between A and P, which are 
symbolized by the box labeled "A, P". If A and P do not agree, they have the 
outside options TA and TP respectively. In the case of agreement (labeled "agree 
(l*(α))") we introduce an investment opportunity Is for P where sא{BS, RS}. The 
investment is a fixed cost and Is>0. It comprises costs, spent to increase the 
                                                          
6
 Indeed, the payment structures vary throughout creative industries and publishers may also pay a 
mixture of lump sum and royalty (Caves 2000; Rub 2013). For simplicity, we normalize the 
payment to a lump sum because we are only interested in the author's share of the cooperation rent 
and not in which way this share is paid out. 
7
 Of course, the proposed benchmark system is not the only observable system in copyrights. But 
as we discuss a remedy against total buyouts, this type of system is feasible. Imagine a system 
where A and P agree upon a contract which lasts only for one period; the results between BS and 
the RS would not differ. 
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overall probability of product success, such as marketing costs to promote A's 
work. 
 Let xj(pj) be the units to be distributed by the copyright holder in situation jא{0, 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6P, 6Q}, where pj denotes the price. Then, P may specify the quantity 
x0 in period one. Assume that a publisher may determine the sales units flexibly in 
any period if she holds the copyright. 
 
 
 
The box labeled "N" depicts the choice of nature whether or not the marketing of 
the creation will be a success in period two, an outcome dependent on chance. The 
success probability is labeled q(IBS) where 0<q(IBS)<1, q'(IBS)>0 and q''(IBS)<0. 
We assume that the investment effect on the probability is characterized by 
limIBS→∞ q
' ሺIBSሻ=0 and limIBS→0 q
' ሺIBSሻ=-∞. With probability 1-q(IBS), P will 
specify x1. Let λj, φj and ψj be the payoffs of player A, P and Q in situation j. Then 
A receives λ1 and P earns φ1. With probability q(IBS), P chooses x2 and the players 
earn λ2 and φ2. Note that P is the only copyright holder in both periods. 
 
3.2 Payoffs 
Before analyzing the model predictions, we describe the players' payoffs. These 
are essential to deriving the bargaining equilibria since the players slip their 
expectations about benefits from cooperation into the negotiation process (Nash 
1950; Rubinstein & Wolinsky 1985; Binmore et al. 1986). 
P A,P 
agree 
(l*(α)) 
N 
IBS, x0 
P 
P 
x1 
x2 
q(IBS) 
1-q(IBS) 
TA,TP 
not 
λ2,φ2 
λ1,φ1 
Figure 1: Sequence of events in the benchmark system (BS) 
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As assumed, A only receives a fixed payment for her efforts. In the BS there is 
only one negotiation opportunity for A; therefore the only income she has is l(α). 
If we assume A's cost of production equal to zero
8
, then following backwards 
induction we can define λ1=λ2=l(α). Let δi be the discount factor of player i where 
iא{A, P, Q}, 0<δi<1, δA<δP, and δQ=1.9 We have learned that under both systems 
the payoffs are risky in period two. Hence, under the BS, A's expected payoff is 
EλBS=(1-q(IBS))λ1+q(IBS)λ2=l(α).  
Regarding the payoffs of the publishers, suppose μj(xj) to be the profit which may 
be made by the copyright holder depending on her choice of distributed units in j. 
We assume the payoffs φ1=μ0(x0)+δPμ1(x1)-IBS-l(α) and φ2=μ0(x0)+δPμ2(x2)-IBS-
l(α). This implies that P expects the payoff EφBS=(1-
q(IBS))φ1+q(IBS)φ2=μ0(x0)+δP((1-q(IBS))μ1(x1)+q(IBS)μ2(x2))-IBS-l(α). Q has no 
expectations in the BS since she is never the copyright holder. 
 
3.3 Solution 
We first analyze P's investment incentives. Following our backwards induction 
approach, the optimal contract in period one may depend on the investment 
decision IBS which is effected after the agreement has been signed (see Figure 1). 
The investment level then determines the likelihood of the creation's success q(Is). 
Because the investment level is dependent on expected total profits, we can derive 
the optimal level by making use of EφBS. The rearrangement of the first order 
condition ∂EφBS/∂IBS=δP((1-q(IBS'))μ1+q(IBS')μ2) 0 yields the optimal investment 
level 
 
                                                          
8
 Of course, authors invest time and effort (cost of expression) and sometimes hire agents which 
may be considered here as a fixed cost. However, because this fixed cost is equal in both scenarios 
there is no effect on our further results at all and it is reasonable to neglect A's costs. 
9
 The discount factor depicts the present value of future gains. A δi<1 implies that the players 
evaluate future gains lower compared to gains today. The assumption δA<δP takes two 
characteristics into account: First, A is risk averse and, unlike the risk neutral P, reluctant to risky 
payments in the future. Second, P is an established market player with a more stable background 
and better connections and may therefore have better access to capital markets compared to A. Q´s 
gains do not require a discount factor because she collects these in the same period in which she 
enters the game and, from her viewpoint, evaluates these as "received today". 
!

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IBS*(μ1, μ2)=ටδP(μ2-μ1). (1) 
 
Now let us turn to the bargaining result in the first period. Remember that under 
this system, A and P negotiate over the fixed wage l(α). Furthermore, since the 
payoffs in the second period are risky, the contestants throw in their expected 
payoffs EλBS and EφBS. The Nash product is NPl=argmax[EλBS-TA]α[EφBS-TP](1-
α)=argmax[l-TA]α[μ0+δP((1-q(IBS))μ1+q(IBS)μ2)-IBS-l-TP](1-α) and the first order 
condition for an internal maximum of the Nash Product is ∂NPl/∂l=α(l-TA)-1-(1-
α)(μ0+δP((1-q(IBS))μ1+q(IBS)μ2)-IBS-l-TP)-1 0. Then, the optimal initial contract 
which maximizes the Nash product is 
 
l*(α,q(IBS))=α(μ0+δP((1-q(IBS))μ1+q(IBS)μ2)-IBS+(
1
α
-1)TA-TP). (2) 
 
Since (1) determines the optimal investment for this system, the optimal initial 
contract can also be written as 
 
l*(α)=α(μ0-2ටδP(μ2-μ1)+δPμ2+(
1
α
-1)TA-TP). (3) 
 
For simplicity, assume the outside options TA and TP to be zero.10 The 
remuneration for A increases in her bargaining power as we can see by 
∂l*(α)/∂α=μ0-2ටδP(μ2-μ1)+δPμ2>0. Note that l*(α) increases as δP→1 if we 
consider ∂l*(α)/∂δP=α(
μ2-μ1
ටδP(μ2-μ1)
+μ2)>0. This is straightforward if we consider that 
the less P discounts future payoffs, the higher the joint surplus and consequently 
the higher A's remuneration for a given share. We can further see from (3) that δA 
has no influence on the bargaining result; A receives the payment immediately in 
the first period, cancelling out the risk aversion and discounting problem. 
                                                          
10
 We demonstrate the outside options for completeness purpose, but leave them out in the ongoing 
analysis as our results have shown that these are from minor importance for the results. 
!

10 
 
4. Reform system 
4.1 Set-up 
The sequence of events for the RS is illustrated in Figure 2. The game starts with 
the negotiations between A and P, which are symbolized by the box labeled "A, 
P". Without agreement, the players have their outside options TA and TP 
respectively. If the contestants agree (labeled "agree (m*(α))") P has the 
investment opportunity IRS. In addition, P may specify the quantity x3 in period 
one. 
Subsequently, the nature randomly chooses whether or not the marketing of the 
creation will be a success in period two, depicted by the box labeled "N". The 
parameter q(IRS) denotes the success probability and we assume  0<q(IRS)<1, 
q'(IRS)>0, q''(IRS)<0, just as in the BS. There is an investment effect on the 
probability as well which is characterized by limIRS→∞ q
' ሺIRSሻ=0 and 
limIRS→0 q
' ሺIRSሻ=-∞. With probability 1-q(IRS), P will specify x4. 
  
 
 
We further assume that Q has a "cherry picking" mentality and will not enter into 
negotiations with A if the product is to be a flop in period two.
11
 This implies that 
P remains the only copyright holder in the "flop" scenario. Then A receives λ4, P 
earns φ4 and Q gets nothing because she is not a copyright holder. With 
                                                          
11
 A reason could be that Q's outside option TQ is higher than estimated profits from distributing 
the product flop. 
A,P P N 
P 
A,Q 
P λ5,φ5,TQ 
TA,TP λ4,φ4, 0 
agree 
(m*(α)) 
not 
IRS, x3 
x4 
q(IRS) 
1-q(IRS) 
x5 
agree 
(n*(β)) 
not 
P, Q 
x6P(γ), 
x6Q(γ) 
λ6,φ6(γ),ψ6(γ) 
Figure 2: Sequence of events in the reform system (RS) 
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probability q(IRS), the cherry picking Q is interested in the product and bargains 
over the copyright grant, labeled by the box "A, Q". Let TQ>0 be Q's outside 
option, then n(β) will only be specified if 
 
ψ6(γ)>TQ ᴧ λ6>λ5 (4) 
 
holds true. 
Suppose that this condition is not fulfilled; then P decides upon x5 and the players 
collect λ5, φ5 and TQ. Given that the condition is fulfilled, the triangle "P, Q" in 
Figure 2 depicts the competition between the publishers in period two. We 
therefore introduce the parameter 0<γ<1, which denotes the degree of 
competition if both publishers produce concurrently in an oligopolistic market. A 
very high γ signals a highly competitive market, and a very low γ signals low 
competition between the publishers.
12
 For the ongoing analysis, we use the 
Cournot model to illustrate the problem of both publishers having to 
simultaneously decide what quantity to produce. Thus, P and Q choose x6P(γ) and 
x6Q(γ) as the best response to their opponents' choice. Finally, the players receive 
λ6, φ6 and ψ6. 
 
4.2 Payoffs 
We initially describe the players' payoffs. As assumed, A only receives a fixed 
payment for her efforts. For the same reason, she would earn λ4=λ5=m(α) in the RS 
because there is only one negotiation opportunity for A since Q does not enter into 
negotiations. However if Q occurs then λ6=m(α)+δAn(β). The expected payoffs 
differ in whether or not condition (4) is fulfilled. Given (4) is untrue and letting # 
denote this scenario, then EλRS#=(1-q(IRS))λ4+q(IRS)λ5=m(α). If (4) holds true, A 
expects to collect EλRS=(1-q(IRS))λ4+q(IRS)λ6=m(α)+q(IRS)δAn(β). 
Q has no profit expectations in the RS if (4) is not true since she is not a copyright 
holder. As a result, P's payoffs are φ4=μ3(x3)+δPμ4(x4)-IRS-m(α) and 
                                                          
12
 High competition may occur if both publishers distribute very homogeneous products to the 
same consumers. Low competition may result from the fact that Q has access to a niche market 
and offers a slightly different product, which attracts specifically the aforementioned market. 
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φ5=μ3(x3)+δPμ5(x5)-IRS-m(α). This yields EφRS#=(1-
q(IRS))φ4+q(IRS)φ5=μ3(x3)+δP((1-q(IRS))μ4(x4)+q(IRS)μ5(x5))-IRS-m(α). If (4) is true, 
then φ6=μ3(x3)+δPμ6P(x6P,x6Q,γ)-IRS-m(α) and it follows that EφRS=(1-
q(IRS))φ4+q(IRS)φ6=μ3(x3)+δP((1-q(IRS))μ4(x4)+q(IRS)μ6P(x6P,x6Q,γ))-IRS-m(α). With 
this condition fulfilled, Q is a copyright holder in period two and consequently 
collects ψ6=μ6Q(x6Q,x6P,γ)-n(β). This implies that she has the payoff expectations 
EψRS=q(IRS)μ6Q(x6Q,x6P,γ)-n(β). 
Note that in j=6P the initial publisher strategically determines her quantity as the 
best reply on her opponents choice, for a given degree of competition (and vice 
versa). In every other situation P may choose only considering her own properties. 
This suggests that P will act as a monopolist
13
 in j≠6P, if we leave out strategic 
behavior for the moment. The structure of the game reveals another characteristic 
which is summarized in the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma 1. If condition (4) is not satisfied, the monopolistic P will choose her 
quantity in j such that x0=x3, x1=x4 and x2=x5. From this it follows that μ0=μ3, 
μ1=μ4 and μ2=μ5, which implies φ1=φ4 and φ2=φ5. Since the expectations of P 
about the total payoff will be equal as well, i.e. EφBS=EφRS#, we can conclude that 
IBS=IRS# and l(α)=m(α). In other words, there would be no difference between the 
two systems. 
 
Proof. See Appendix. ז
 
The contracts which will be concluded between A and P under both systems will 
not differ if A and Q will not come to an agreement anyway. For this reason, we 
put aside this scenario in our further analysis and always assume that (4) holds 
true. This leads to the next result: 
 
                                                          
13
 In many markets publishers rather face an oligopoly (Caves 2000; Towse 2006). However, the 
monopoly assumption makes our analysis more transparent, and the relation between publishers of 
different goods plays no role in our analysis as we compare the competition effects for the same 
good. 
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Lemma 2. Under the RS, P will make lower profits in period two whenever γ>0. 
Moreover, an increase in γ diminishes the profits of both publishers in period two 
equally. 
 
Proof. The proof follows from the outcome of the Cournot model. It shows that 
whenever two market players have to consider their opponents strategic choice in 
a simultaneous game, their individual distribution output, the prices and 
consequently the profits of the contestants decrease in the Cournot equilibrium 
compared to the monopolistic situation (Varian 2005). Due to our assumptions, 
the publishers are identical and therefore the impact of γ is equivalent (Singh & 
Vives 1984). The mathematical proof for the underlying argument can be found in 
the appendix. ז 
 
4.3 Solution 
Following backwards induction, we start in period two, where the renegotiation 
happens only in the RS. A and Q negotiate over payment n(β) and agree whenever 
(4) is possible. Note that renegotiation occurs only once in period two. The actual 
payoffs to be considered are λ6 and ψ6. The outside options can be derived by 
considering condition (4): without agreement, A and Q would face λ5 and TQ, and 
consequently they use these alternatives as a threat in negotiations to determine 
their bargaining position. 
Based on these definitions, the Nash product is NPn=argmax[λ6-λ5]β[ψ6-TQ](1-
β)=argmax[δAn]β[μ6Q(γ)-n-TQ](1-β). Then, the first order condition for an internal 
maximum of the Nash product is ∂NPn/∂n=
βቀ-n+μ6Q(γ)-TQቁ
1-β
(δAn)
β
n
- ൫1-β൯(δA-n)
β
(-n+μ6Q(γ)-TQ)
β 0 
and the Nash bargaining solution predicts 
 
n*(β)=β(μ6Q(γ)-TQ). (5) 
 
!

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Note that A's share increases in her own bargaining power due to both 
∂n*(β)/∂β=μ6Q(γ)-TQ>0 and our assumption that (4) holds true.14 Furthermore, the 
bargaining result builds on Q's expected profits adjusted by her outside option. 
Considering our result from Lemma 2, this implies that whenever the competition 
factor γ increases, the remuneration paid by Q in period two decreases as a result 
of a lower joint surplus. 
The next step is to derive the optimal investment level by making use of EφRS. The 
first order condition is ∂EφRS/∂IRS=δP((1-q(IRS'))μ1+q(IRS')μ2) 0 and 
rearrangement yields 
 
IRS*(μ4, μ6P(γ))=ටδP(μ6P(γ)-μ4). (6) 
 
We may now use the previous results to finally determine how the initial contract 
looks like in the RS. Analogous to the BS, A and P negotiate on the basis of their 
expected payoffs, deducted by their respective outside options. The Nash product 
then is NPm=argmax[EλRS-TA]α[EφRS-TP](1-α)=argmax[m+q(IRS)δAn-
TA]α[μ3+δP((1-q(IRS))μ4+q(IRS)μ6P)-IRS-m-TP](1-α) and the first derivative reveals 
the first order condition ∂NPm/∂m=α(m+q(IRS)δAn-TA)-1-(1-α)(μ3+δP((1-
q(IRS))μ4+q(IRS)μ6P)-IRS-m-TP)-1 0. If we rearrange this equation and solve for m, 
we get 
 
m*(α,q(IRS),n)=α(μ3+δP((1-q(IRS))μ4+q(IRS)μ6P)-IRS-(
1
α
-1)(q(IRS)δAn-TA)-TP). (7) 
 
The optimal contract with all optimality conditions can be determined if we insert 
the values from IRS and n which are available in (5) and (6). The rearranged 
equation then is 
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 Using equation (5), equation (4) implies that μ6Q(γ)>TQ because μ6Q(γ)-β(μ6Q(γ)-TQ)>TQ must be 
fulfilled. 
!

!

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m*(α)=α(μ3-2ටδP(μ6P-μ4)+δPμ6P-(
1
α
-1)((1- 1
ටδP(μ6P-μ4)
)δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)-TA)-TP). (8) 
 
5. Comparison 
5.1 Investment incentives 
Our results in equations (1) and (6) reveal that the optimal investment level 
IRS*(μ4, μ6P(γ)) is dependent on the competition factor γ, whereas IBS*(μ1, μ2) is 
not. If we juxtapose both optimality conditions we may define the next result: 
 
Proposition 1. The investment level is strictly lower in the RS than in the BS 
whenever γ>0, and decreasing strictly monotonously with respect to γ. 
 
Proof. The proof follows immediately from (1), (6), Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. 
Because μ1=μ4 and μ2>μ6P are true, it is apparent that 
 
IBS*(μ1, μ2)-IRS*(μ4, μ6P(γ>0))=ටδP(μ2-μ1)-ටδP(μ6P(γ>0)-μ4)>0. 
 
Furthermore, ∂μ6P/∂γ=-
2(cP-a)
2
b(2+γ)3
<0 shows that μ6P is strictly decreasing in γ, 
implying that equation (6) is smaller the greater γ is. ז
 
As we have shown, the investment incentives mainly depend on the competition 
factor in the RS. This is because more competition reduces the expected profits of 
the initial publisher in period two. As a result, the publisher simply needs lower 
levels of investment to compensate for these lower profit expectations, as 
compared to the expectations in the BS. Indeed, higher investments still increase 
the probability of product success; however, they do cause higher fixed costs in 
period one. Thus, the probability of product success will be greater in the BS, an 
intuitive result if we consider q(IBS)>q(IRS). 
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5.2 Lifetime income 
Taking a closer look at the remuneration itself, and considering the interaction 
between the bargaining result from periods one and two in the RS, we present the 
next result: 
 
Lemma 3. The higher the remuneration from the second contract, the lower the 
initial remuneration. Moreover, the remuneration in the initial contract is higher 
under the BS. 
 
Proof. We can already see from the partial derivative in equation (7) 
∂m*(α,q(IBS),n)/∂n=(α-1)q(IRS)δA<0 whenever α<1 and q(IRS)δA>0 that n has a 
negative impact on m. Furthermore, if we consider (3) and (8) we can formally 
describe our statement with 
 
l*(α)-m*(α)= 
α(δP(μ2-μ6P)-2(ටδP(μ2-μ1)-ටδP(μ6P-μ4)))+(1-α)(1-
1
ටδP(μ6P-μ4)
)δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)>0 
 
which is true if we assume from now on δP(μ6P-μ4)>1. The rearranged inequality 
is δP(μ2-μ6P)-2(ටδP(μ2-μ1)-ටδP(μ6P-μ4))>-(
1
α
-1)(1- 1
ටδP(μ6P-μ4)
)δAβ(μ6Q-TQ). Then, 
the right hand side is always negative and we can consider the left hand side 
separately. The left hand side is positive if δP(μ2-μ6P)>2(ටδP(μ2-μ1)-ටδP(μ6P-μ4)), 
which is nothing else than (0.5δP(μ2-μ6P))2>δP(μ2-μ6P), keeping in mind our result 
from Lemma 1. This can be rearranged to 2> ln (δP(μ2-μ6P))
ln (0.5δP(μ2-μ6P))
, confirming that the left 
hand side of the rearranged inequality is always positive. ז 
 
Corollary 1. Based on our assumptions, there exist contingent bargaining results 
for m* if, and only if, μ6P-μ4>1/δP. 
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Proof. See appendix. ז
 
There are two intuitions behind our results. First, the bargaining rent is shared 
based on the expectations of the negotiating parties about their expected payoffs. 
Thus, whenever the initial agreement enables A to earn in the future, this will be 
already considered in the initial contract because it is anticipated by the 
contestants. Here, any risk and time-adjusted earning diminishes the initial 
remuneration. For this reason, m*(α) increases as δA→0, because the lower A 
perceives her future payment, the less this payment burdens her part of the Nash 
product. This is shown by ∂m*(α)/∂δA=(1-
1
α
)αβ(1- 1
ටδP(μ6P-μ4)
)(μ6Q-TQ)<0. Note that 
the above results are all independent for every degree of competition, and by 
intuition, hold true as long as n>0. 
Second, the competition in period two decreases the expected payoff of P because 
the oligopolistic competition decreases her expected profits in the "success" 
scenario. This has a negative impact on the bargaining rent, and there is thus less 
to be shared in the initial contract. Consequently, P internalizes this effect in the 
RS, which becomes noticeable in the initial contract. 
For completeness purposes, we can add that, analogous to the BS, A's bargaining 
power has a positive effect on her share. This is proven since the partial derivative 
∂m*(α)/∂α=μ3-2ටδP(μ6P-μ4)+δPμ6P+(1-
ଵ
ඥఋುሺఓలುିఓరሻ
)δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)>0.15 
The question which remains unanswered is whether or not A will benefit from the 
new system. Indeed, she receives two payments, but it was not shown yet under 
which circumstances the additional contract with Q may outweigh the losses from 
internalized harm in the initial contract with P. Only this circumstance would 
increase A's lifetime income in the RS. To examine this, we need to consider the 
sum of payments in the RS and compare it to the onetime payment from the BS. 
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 We can rearrange the inequality to μ3+δPμ6+δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)>2ටδP൫μ6P-μ4൯+
δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)
ටδP(μ6P-μ4)
. Then 
∂m*(α)/∂α>0 is true since μ3>2ටδP൫μ6P-μ4൯, δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)>
δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)
ටδP(μ6P-μ4)
 and because δPμ6P>0. 
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The total remuneration in the RS results from (5) and (7), whereby A earns n*(β) 
only with probability q(IRS) and evaluates this risky future payment weighted by 
δA. Considering our result from (2), the inequality l*(α)<m*(α)+q(IRS)δAn*(β) 
must hold true in order for authors to be better off under the new system. If we 
include the optimality conditions through our previous results we get the 
following outcome: 
 
Proposition 2.  Authors are better off under the RS if, and only if, the lifetime 
income condition 
 
LIC: δP[q(IRS)(μ6P-μ4)-q(IBS)(μ2-μ1)]+IBS-IRS+q(IRS)δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)>0 (9) 
 
is fulfilled. Then, no system is strictly superior in terms of lifetime income. 
 
Proof. The proof for inequality (9) follows immediately from inserting the 
optimality conditions from our previous results into -l*(α)+m*(α) +q(IRS)δAn*(β) 
>0. To demonstrate the correctness of the second statement from Proposition 2 we 
need to take a closer look at the lifetime income condition. First, we learned from 
Proposition 1 that IBS-IRS>0. Second, we know from (6) that q(IRS)δAβ(μ6Q-TQ)>0 
for β>0. Third, let us consider the expression in squared brackets for a given δP. It 
follows that q(IRS)(μ6P-μ4)-q(IBS)(μ2-μ1)<0 is true for two reasons: we know from 
Proposition 1 that q(IRS)-q(IBS)<0, and from Lemma 2 that μ6P-μ2<0, both given 
that γ>0. Thus, the first two partial results have a positive and the latter a negative 
impact on (9). Additionally, the fulfillment of this condition depends on the 
parameter settings. It follows that no system strictly guarantees a higher lifetime 
income. ז 
 
Note that the lifetime income condition is independent of the outside options, 
apart from our assumption that these are zero. If we compare the first derivatives 
of equations (2) and (7) we get the same results ∂l*(α)/∂TA=∂m*(α)/∂TA=(1-α)>0 
and ∂l*(α)/∂TP=∂m*(α)/∂TP=-α<0, respectively. Because q(IRS)δAn*(β) is not 
19 
 
affected by the initial outside options, these cancel out in (9). The same result can 
be observed for the profits of period one (μ0 and μ3), because these are equal 
according to Lemma 1. 
Moreover, note that α also does not affect the lifetime income condition. Indeed, 
both systems suppose equal bargaining power in period one. But we have also 
shown in the proof of Lemma 3 that the impact of the period two bargaining result 
n on m*(α,q(IBS),n) is weighted with α. This internalization effect (P adjusts 
expectations by the second period remuneration) cancels out in the lifetime 
income analysis because we now add the second period remuneration.  
The fulfillment of the lifetime income condition varies for different parameter 
settings, and we can identify five parameters whose effects are worth investigating 
(9): γ, β, δA, δP and TQ. Let us first discuss the direction of impact by each 
parameter given that all remaining parameters are fixed. 
We learned from Proposition 1 that a higher competition factor γ undermines 
incentives to invest, and from Lemma 2 that profits in period two decrease for 
both publishers. Thus, an increasing γ does not contribute to the fulfillment of 
condition (9) because there is less bargaining rent to be shared from period two in 
the RS, and we have LIC→0 as γ→1. Equally, LIC→0 as TQ→μ6Q, which is 
mathematically proven with ∂LIC/∂TQ=-q(IRS)δAβ<0. The first derivatives 
∂LIC/∂β=q(IRS)δA(μ6Q-TQ)>0 and ∂LIC/∂δA=q(IRS)β(μ6Q-TQ)>0 demonstrate that 
LIC→∞ as β→1 and as δA→1. 
Referring to the discount factor of P, we can see that ∂LIC/∂δP=-[q(IBS)(μ2-μ1)-
q(IRS)(μ6P-μ4)]<0, which mainly follows from our proof for Proposition 2. This 
yields LIC→0 as δP→1, a seemingly counterintuitive result not in line with our 
previous findings as we usually determined a positive effect on the joint surplus 
with increasing discount factor. In the lifetime income analysis, however, the 
intuition is of a different nature: the confrontation of the two systems reveals a 
contrariness due to lower profits and underinvestment, and inhibits the initial 
remuneration in the RS. The expression in squared brackets demonstrates this 
circumstance. Such a negative effect is promoted whenever δP→1 because it 
proportionally increases the gap between the systems. 
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The relation between the parameters which define the profits, for example 
saturation points a and d or the cost ci, influence our results insofar as they 
determine the overall size of rent to be shared. Our assumptions that both systems 
share equal saturation points for the "success" and "flop" scenario, and that costs 
are constant and equal for the publishers, result in symmetric changes and for this 
reason show almost no effect in the lifetime income analysis. Thus our results are 
stable, and it is sensible to neglect changes in the ongoing discussion. 
It remains to be shown how the residual parameters interact with respect to the 
lifetime income condition. We focus on the interrelation between β, γ and δA for 
two reasons: first, we suspect parameters that model publishers to be more stable 
than parameters that model authors. Thus, δP may be less volatile than δA, and TQ 
only slightly volatile. The argument for this is that copyright publishers usually 
are established market players with both a portfolio of alternative opportunities 
and an easier access to capital markets. Furthermore, it is well observed that 
career progress, risk attitude, bargaining power and other related properties bring 
forth many diverse types of authors in the creative industries (Caves 2000; Towse 
2006). Second, simulations reveal that changes in the competition factor 
meaningfully affect our presented results. For completeness purposes, we at least 
discuss the potential impact of the unattended parameters. 
Figure 3
16
 depicts the relationship between A's bargaining power β and the 
competition factor γ. Any position in the top right of the graph illustrates a weakly 
contested oligopoly where A earns a high share of the profits. In contrast, any 
position in the bottom left depicts the situation where P and Q have to rigorously 
compete to obtain customers, and where Q withholds a high share of the profits in 
period two. The two sinuous lines describe the border corresponding to inequality 
(9). Any hatched area to the top left then embodies parameter settings under 
which the RS yields a higher remuneration to authors, a situation we term lifetime 
income efficient. There are two borders because we additionally demonstrate how 
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 Figures 3 and 4 are composed of a discount factor δP=0.95 close to one. We suppose this to be 
sensible because it reveals an approximate opportunity cost of capital of r=0.053 on alternative 
investments. The outside option is assumed to be TQ=0.25*μ6Q, around 25% of the potential profit. 
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a high discount factor of A (δA) changes the lifetime income efficiency area as 
compared to a low discount factor (δA). 
In our setting, a very low discount factor restricts the hatched area, as it 
undermines A's evaluation of the future payment and impedes the fulfillment of 
the lifetime income condition. This is in line with our previous argumentation as 
is the observation that the hatched area would enlarge with decreasing δP and 
diminish with increasing TQ. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 takes up the previous findings, and provides a different view by 
incorporating the lifetime income in monetary values (denoted ¤). Any position to 
the top demonstrates higher lifetime income, and to the right higher bargaining 
power in the negotiations in period two. The left graph shows our results for a 
high discount factor of A, and the right for a low discount factor of A. In both, the 
bold horizontal line stems from the constant remuneration in the BS and depicts 
the border for which any position to the top is lifetime income efficient (similar to 
the hatched area of Figure 3). Finally, the dotted curves illustrate the lifetime 
income under the RS, increasing in β, for different levels of competition. 
We can now clearly determine under which circumstances authors will benefit. If 
there is almost no competition between the publishers in period two, where γ is 
0         .5   1 
β 
0 
 
 
      
.5
 
  
 
 
1 
γ 
δA 
δA 
Figure 3: The β-γ relationship for diverse discount factors 
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close to zero, authors will always be better off. P will not suffer collapsing profits 
and simply adjust the payment to A. Additionally, A will earn from the contract 
with Q. On the contrary, we can see from both graphs that authors would almost 
always suffer from the new system if the competition is high. This holds true even 
if A would be a superstar and could demand a large proportion of the joint surplus 
in the renegotiated contract. 
There is no such strict effect with regards to the discount factor of A. Indeed, the 
more A discounts future payoffs, the lower the chance that she may be better off 
under the RS. However, especially in the right graph of Figure 4, we can see that 
there still exist solutions for a low discount factor under which authors would 
benefit. However, this requires a predominantly low competition factor, which in 
turn may necessitate high bargaining power. 
 
 
Now imagine a young author who may be an aspiring star, but who evaluates all 
future income weakly because due to few alternatives. She highly depends on an 
immediate income and fears the future downfall of her career. Even optimistically 
assuming a sparkling career, she may be interested in selling the copyrights for a 
given work for a lifetime in order to optimize her expected income and avoid fear 
¤ 
β 
0             1 
δA 
0 
 
 
 
1 
γ 
lifetime income in the RS lifetime income in the BS 
¤ 
β 
0             1 
δA 
0 
 
 
 
1 
γ 
Figure 4: β, γ, and δA effects on the absolute lifetime income 
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of competition or low bargaining power in the future. This problem intensifies if 
we keep in mind that there rarely exists an author who has high bargaining power 
over her career life cycle (Caves 2000; Kretschmer 2005). Considering our results 
from the previous section and the dynamic promotional effect of publisher 
investments on career progress of authors (Caves 2000), the new system appears 
to be increasingly unattractive. Thus, if we assume a successful career, publishers 
would very likely compete in the market for consumers in the future if the 
copyrighted good was still attractive.
17
 
On the other hand, established authors may be less dependent on the investments 
of publishers already being in a financial and prominent position that enables a 
wider choice of options. Consequently, they may not fear risky projects as much 
as their unestablished colleagues, and may already be more experienced in 
negotiations. However, even for them, the new system may offer lower lifetime 
earnings on their creations if there will be more competition between publishers. 
Recalling the analysis of Figure 3, even a low discount and a very high stake in 
period two may still be not sufficient to outweigh the effect of an already 
moderate competition factor. 
 
5.3 Rents and social welfare analysis 
So far we have restricted our analysis to the author-publisher relationship by 
analyzing the division of the emerging joint surplus from their cooperation. Note 
that the joint surplus can also be depicted as the producer rent. At this point we 
add the consumer side in order to complement the market situation. The consumer 
surplus is the difference between the maximum willingness to pay minus the 
actual price to be paid for the creation. We define the consumer rent as the 
aggregated surplus of all consuming individuals that obtain the creation. Social 
surplus is the total value of publishing the creation minus the cost of creating and 
marketing the creation. Social welfare is then the aggregated value of all utility 
that all involved individuals obtain from the creation. 
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 Of course, if there is no demand in the future this discussion makes no sense. However, 
evidence shows that there are many markets where creative goods last even longer than the authors 
lifetime (Caves 2000) . For example music labels from diverse countries are still predominantly 
reliant on back-catalog sales (Rohter 2011; Rub 2013). 
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To present the analysis in a simple way it makes sense to ignore the first period 
because P will choose equal quantity and prices under both systems (compare 
Lemma 1). Thus, the rents are equal and the following results can be derived 
independent of the first period. Let ECRs denote the expected consumer rent and 
ESWs the expected social welfare from period two in system s. According to our 
definition, the aggregated consumer surplus for each system is ECRBS=
1
2
[(1-
q(IBS))(d-p1)x1+q(IBS)(a-p2)x2] and ECRRS=
1
2
[(1-q(IRS))(d-p4)x4+q(IRS)((a-
p6P)x6P+(a-p6Q)x6Q)]. The expected social welfare is the sum of consumer and 
producer rent and therefore ESWBS=(1-q(IBS))μ1+q(IBS)μ2+
1
2
[(1-q(IBS))(d-
p1)x1+q(IBS)(a-p2)x2] and ESWRS=(1-q(IRS))μ4+q(IRS)(μ6P+μ6Q)+
1
2
[(1-q(IRS))(d-
p4)x4+q(IRS)((a-p6P)x6P+(a-p6Q)x6Q)]. The comparison of both systems regarding 
the consumer rents and total rents yields the next two results: 
 
Proposition 3.  In the RS, (i) the consumer rent is higher if condition 
 
CRC: (1+γ)q(IRS)(μ6P+μ6Q)-q(IBS)μ2+(q(IBS)-q(IRS))μ4>0 (10) 
 
is satisfied and (ii) the social welfare increases if the following condition is 
fulfilled: 
 
SWC: (1+0.5(1+γ))q(IRS)(μ6P+μ6Q)-1.5q(IBS)μ2+1.5((1-q(IRS))μ4-(1-
q(IBS)μ1)>0. 
(11) 
 
Proof. See appendix. ז
 
Note that both conditions only depend on the profit characteristics and P's 
discount factor δP reflected in Is. The competition factor γ is included in both μ6P 
and μ6Q, and consequently integrated in IRS. Figure 518 illustrates the impact of 
competition on the ECRs, ESWs and the expected producer rent (denoted EPRs) for 
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 See supra note 16 for the remaining parameter settings. 
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increasing competition factor. Any position to the bottom right stands for a lower 
rent (or a lower sum of rents respectively) with increasing competition factor. 
There are two graphs: one with a meaningful variance in expected profits between 
the "success" and "flop" scenario, and one with a low variance.
19
 
We can see in Figure 5 that even for a situation with low variance and high 
competition the consumers would likely be better off under the RS. There do exist 
parameter settings where (10) is not satisfied and consequently ECRRS<ECRBS. 
However, this would require almost no variance between the scenarios and a very 
low discount factor of P. In the previous section we have argued that at least the 
latter is rather unlikely. Note that the consumer rent in the RS is declining with 
increasing competition. Indeed, more competition decreases prices and increases 
quantity. However in our setting, γ→1 also increases the slope of the demand 
curve and a more competitive duopoly decreases rents. 
Figure 5 shows that whenever γ is small or close to zero, inequality (11) is 
satisfied and the RS is welfare superior. The sum of producer and consumer rent is 
simply higher. However, Figure 5 also reveals that whenever γ→1, both producer 
and consumer rent decrease, and consequently so does social welfare. Both graphs 
show that whenever EPRBS<EPRRS, social welfare is always higher in the RS 
because consumer rent at this threshold value of γ is always higher in the RS. 
However if EPRBS>EPRRS, the RS is always welfare superior as long as ECRRS-
ECRBS>EPRBS-EPRRS. 
A low variance between profits in the "success" and "flop" scenarios fosters the 
negative effect of increasing γ on the rents and social welfare. The intuition is that 
the more similar the scenarios are, the less attractive it is for each market side to 
stand on the "success scenario". Following Proposition 1, P's incentives to invest 
under both systems decrease. Especially under the RS, as γ increases, μ6P and μ4 
move towards the same value, and the "success" scenario thus becomes 
increasingly unattractive. 
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 The variance can be achieved by varying the distance between the saturation points. 
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In both graphs of Figure 5 we can clearly see that similar to our findings in the 
previous section, the results strongly depend on the competition factor γ. Thus, 
whenever weak or no competition between publishers after the embargo period is 
expected, the new system makes sense for all involved parties. However, this 
outcome vanishes as expected competition increases. Our results show that the 
negative effect of more competition hits the initial publisher, but especially 
damages the authors, as their only income significantly decreases. 
 
6. Discussion 
Before turning to the conclusion of our paper, we briefly discuss our assumptions, 
which may be questionable from a practical point of view. First, we assume only 
two periods, and that profits in the second period are equal to the first period. Of 
course there may be following periods with more and more publishers, however 
this would not cause a deviation from the intention of our results. More 
competition would decrease expectations about future profits and this would be 
internalized in contracts from previous periods. The assumption that profits are 
Figure 5: Rents and social welfare depending on γ 
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stable over the periods is rarely seen in the creative industries. For example a 
painting may become more and more valuable overtime, and a music creation 
may offer no profit margin a half-year after release. Without future profits, our 
analysis shows no difference between the two systems. However, whenever there 
is something to share in the future, the presented model is applicable. 
Second, we modeled the publisher relationship with the Cournot oligopoly, but 
left out other types such as the Stackelberg or Bertrand approach. In the Bertrand 
model, the competition would completely undermine profits (Varian 2005) in the 
future and foster the undesirability of the RS. The initial contract would be settled 
based on the profit expectations from the first period, and there would not be 
much left to share in period two (with our assumption of symmetric publishers A 
would simply get nothing). This situation recalls the termination right for which 
related results on authors' income may be found in Karas & Kirstein (2017). 
Using the Stackelberg model and assuming that P was the leader (probably an 
advantage in time as long as A and Q negotiate) would relax the negotiations 
between A and P in the initial contract as a leader makes higher profits compared 
to the simultaneous player in the Cournot oligopoly (Singh & Vives 1984; Varian 
2005). Indeed, A would receive a lower payment in the future, but as a risk averse 
player, be probably better off. Assuming that P was the follower (probably A and 
Q negotiate already in period one) would burden the relationship between A and P 
in the initial contract as a follower makes lower profits compared to the 
simultaneous player in the Cournot oligopoly (Varian 2005). In summary, 
whatever oligopoly is underlying, the competition factor specifies the outcomes 
which determine the joint surplus, which in turn define the contract in each 
period. Thus, the direction of our results changes, but not their quality. The same 
rationale applies if the firms have differing cost structures. 
Third, we left out an investment opportunity of Q in period two. In reality, high 
fixed costs are often observed in creative industries and entry barriers may exist 
(Caves 2000; Handke et al. 2016). Thus, Q may be forced to invest into marketing 
and production to assert herself in the market and to compete with P. On the one 
hand, this may increase the desirability of the new system because the additional 
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investment could increase overall demand and consequently rents. On the other 
hand this may offer strategic leeway in the form of predatory pricing or 
cartelization. From condition (4) we know that Q would be happy to enter the 
market whenever potential profits exceed her outside option. If she would have to 
bear high investment costs to enter, P may set a lower price to set up an entry 
barrier and try to prevent competition. Such strategic behavior would definitely 
make authors worse off because the profit expectations would always be lower 
compared to the BS. The problem of cartelization would increase the producer 
rents, but also decrease consumer rent. Moreover, it is questionable whether more 
arrangements between publishers would weaken the bargaining power of authors 
and thus make authors even worse off. 
Fourth, we presumed that authors are only interested in money, an unrealistic 
assumption considering the various intrinsic motivations of authors. A 
consideration of these would set up a new trade-off: our results do show that it is 
likely that authors will be worse off under the RS. However, authors also prefer a 
high distribution of their creations and under the new system the aggregated 
output is higher. Depending on the utility function of A, she may be better off in 
the RS even if she earns less, as long as the distributional effect outweighs the 
negative effect on income. We left this motive out because this study is mainly 
interested in the income effect. For this reason, this assumption does not affect the 
quality of our results. 
Fifth and finally, we discuss the assumption of perfect information, which may 
become the most relevant in the real world. Caves (2000) points out the "nobody 
knows" principle, which states that the success of creations is usually highly 
uncertain and difficult to assess in the contracting stage. Relaxing our assumption 
may likely affect the precision of our results, as these are build on the participants 
expectations about future profits. If these profits are highly uncertain, the players 
will use their expectations to define the contract, which however may over- or 
under-estimate the real value. It is apparent that publishers prefer to under-
estimate and authors to over-estimate, as this increases their shares from the 
cooperation rent. If we keep in mind that publishers are usually the more powerful 
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market side, one can expect that information asymmetry may yield under-
estimation more frequently. This dilemma may downgrade the situation for many 
authors, no matter whether they make use of their right or not. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed the new German copyright law which allows 
authors to resell copyright licenses to additional publishers. We have derived the 
effects on investment incentives, author's lifetime income, rents, and social 
welfare. This system is relevant to all creative industries which have a product life 
cycle longer than 10 years, and is relevant for any situation where the author-
publisher relationship would usually reveal perpetual buy-out contracts. 
Our results show that such a system may undermine publishers incentives to 
invest into author's career whenever the publisher has to compete for her 
customers in the future. The model also predicts that most authors may suffer 
lower pecuniary compensations under the new system, and consequently not 
benefit at all if there is strong competition between the publishers. This is due to 
two reasons: the competition effect decreases and, thus, reduces joint surplus. 
Moreover, the internalization effect forces authors to renounce payments in their 
initial contracts in exchange for an option to renegotiate an additional contract in 
the future. Evidence shows that successful creations are likely contested, leading 
us to conclude that the new system is not likely to fulfill the policy maker's 
intention to benefit authors. 
From the consumer's perspective, the new system is rather beneficial. Publishers 
will decrease prices, offer more to the market, and thereby increase consumer 
rent. Our analysis shows that this result would hold even in strongly competitive 
scenarios. The new system is attractive for low competitive markets and 
predominantly desirable in competitive markets if the difference between the 
"success" and "flop" scenarios is not too small. 
Turning to future research, we suggest the investigation of the new system 
considering the dynamic effects from authors' contracts on their overall careers. 
Authors usually create several works, and such a unilateral option may indeed 
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reduce the earnings for a specific creation, but probably also foster the generation 
of subsequent creations and increase the aggregated lifetime income. Furthermore, 
we encourage more investigation on how the new copyright law changes the 
efforts to create. It would be interesting to test the predictions of our model and to 
see how authors react to possible changes. We often observe that authors mourn 
their financial situation, but also place a high moral value on individual rights. On 
average, German authors possibly value individual rights higher than reductions 
in earnings, and thus enthusiastically welcome the new legislation from a different 
point of view. This however requires further consideration.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
For simplicity, assume that the demand for the good is equal between period one 
and two if the product turns out to be a success. Then, we can define the price 
quantity relationship such that 
 
pj൫xj൯=ቐ
a-bxj                ,j=ሼ0,2,3,5ሽ
d-bxj                ,j=ሼ1,4ሽ       
a-b൫xj+γxk൯ ,j={6P, 6Q}
 
 
 
(I) 
 
where a and d are the saturation points, and a>d. b is the slope of the demand 
curve, kא{6P, 6Q} and j≠k. Remember that we already assumed equal cost 
structures for the publishers. Let us denote the variable cost ci(xi)=cixi>0 and 
remember that iא{A, P, Q}. We already explained that cA=0. Assume ci(xi)=const 
over time. 
P is a monopolistic supplier in the BS and the RS if condition (4) does not hold 
true. For profit maximizing purpose, she will choose her quantity such that 
marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. Using the price quantity relationship 
from (I), we have the expected total profit EφBS=x0(a-bx0-cP)+δP((1-q(IBS))x1(d-
bx1-cP)+q(IBS)x2(a-bx2-cP)-IBS-l(α) in the BS. The first order conditions for P's 
endogenous parameters x0, x1, x2 and IBS are ∂EφBS/∂x2=δPq(IBS)(a-2bx2-cP) 0, 
∂EφBS/∂x1=δP(1-q(IBS))(d-2bx1-cP) 0, ∂EφBS/∂x0=δP(a-2bx0-cP) 0 and 
∂EφBS/∂IBS=δP((1-q(IBS'))μ1+q(IBS')μ2) 0. Solving the equation system yields 
x2*=x0*=
a-cP
2b
, x1*=
d-cP
2b
 and IBS*(μ1, μ2)=ටδP(μ2-μ1). From this it follows that 
μ2*=μ0*=
(a-cP)
2
4b
 and μ1*=
(d-cP)
2
4b
.  
In the RS where (4) does not hold true, P's expected profit is EφRS#=x3(a-bx3-
cP)+δP((1-q(IRS))x4(d-bx4-cP)+q(IRS)x5(a-bx5-cP)-IRS-m(α). From this, the first 
order condition for P's endogenous parameters are ∂EφRS#/∂x5=δPq(IRS)(a-2bx5-cP)
0, ∂EφRS#/∂x4=δP(1-q(IRS))(d-2bx4-cP) 0, ∂EφRS#/∂x3=δP(a-2bx3-cP) 0 and 
!

!

!

!

!

!

!

32 
 
∂EφRS#/∂IRS=δP((1-q(IRS'))μ4+q(IRS')μ5) 0. Then, x5*=x3*=
a-cP
2b
, x4*=
d-cP
2b
 and 
IRS*(μ4, μ5)=ටδP(μ5-μ4). In addition, the profits are μ5*=μ3*=
(a-cP)
2
4b
 and 
μ4*=
(d-cP)
2
4b
. 
Clearly, μ5*=μ2*, μ4*=μ1*, μ3*=μ0* and from this it follows that IBS*(μ1, μ2)-
IRS*(μ4, μ5)=ටδP(μ2-μ1)-ටδP(μ5-μ4)=0. Note that the backwards induction 
approach is not necessary to derive the optimal quantity choice. This is implied by 
our assumption that a publisher may choose her quantity by each period. The 
proof for l(α)=m(α) follows from intuition: α, TA and TP are equal in both systems 
and the profit expectations of P do not differ between the systems. Since there are 
no formal asymmetries and A relies only on her fixed remuneration by P in both 
negotiations, the joint surplus does not change and is shared according to α. This 
implies l(α)=m(α). 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Considering that the underlying market is a Cournot oligopoly, each publisher will 
maximize her profits as the best reaction to her opponent. From (I), we can derive 
μ6P=x6P(a-b(x6P+γx6Q)-cP) and μ6Q=x6Q(a-b(x6Q+γx6P)-cQ). Heading for the 
optimal quantity we get the first order conditions ∂EφRS/∂x6P=δP(a-2bx6P-bγx6Q-
cP) 0 and ∂EψRS/∂x6Q=a-2bx6Q-bγx6P-cP 0. Then, the reaction functions are 
x6P*(x6Q,γ)=
a-bγx6Q-cP
2b
 and x6Q*(x6P,γ)=
a-bγx6P-cP
2b
. Considering the fact that due to our 
assumptions the two publishers are identical, we can set cP=cQ and x6P=x6Q. It 
follows that the optimal quantities are x6P*(γ)=x6Q*(γ)=
a-cP
b(2+γ)
, which implies 
μ6P*(γ)=
(a-cP)
2
bሺ2+γሻ2
. If γ>0 we can see that x2*-x6P*(γ>0)=
a-cP
2b
- a-cP
b(2+γ)
>0 and 
consequently μ2*-μ6P*(γ>0)=
(a-cP)
2
4b
- (a-cP)
2
bሺ2+γሻ2
>0. Then, μ2*-μ6P*(γ=0)=
(a-cP)
2
4b
 - 
(a-cP)
2
4b
=0. One marginal unit of γ decreases the profit of P in j=6P by 
!

!

!

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∂μ6P*/∂γ=-
2(cP-a)
2
b(2+γ)3
. Because both firms are identical, the latter is also true for the 
profit function of Q. 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
We assumed 0<q(Is)<1 which, if we consider (6), is equal to 0<1-
1
ටδP(μ6P-μ4)
<1 in 
the RS. As long as (along with our assumptions holding true) μ6P-μ4>0 and δP>0, 
the upper bound is always obeyed. However, this is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the lower bound since there exist two regions for the influence of n 
on m. Note that if δP(μ6P-μ4)<1 then 1-
1
ටδP(μ6P-μ4)
<0, and the initial assumption and 
consequently Lemma 3 are not fulfilled. Thus, we show that whenever Corollary 1 
is fulfilled the results are stable and in line with our assumptions. To support our 
assumptions consider the following example: let r denote P's opportunity cost of 
capital and suppose the very excessive case that r=0.4. This results in an 
approximate discount factor δP=1/(1+0.4)=0.714. For this discount factor, the 
difference between profits ought to be μ6P-μ4>1/.83≈1.4 in absolute values to 
satisfy stability and correctness of our results. Keeping in mind that we compare a 
"success" and "flop" scenario, where the differences in profits may be located in 
thousands or millions of absolute (monetary) values, clarifies the reasonability of 
Corollary 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Part (i): ECRBS=
1
2
[(1-q(IBS))(d-p1)x1+q(IBS)(a-p2)x2] and ECRRS=
1
2
[(1-q(IRS))(d-
p4)x4+q(IRS)((a-p6P)x6P+(a-p6Q)x6Q)] are, considering the proof of Lemma 1 and 2, 
equivalent to ECRBS=
1
2
[(1-q(IBS))μ1+q(IBS)μ2] and ECRRS=
1
2
[(1-
q(IRS))μ4+q(IRS)(μ6P+μ6Q)]. ECRBS<ECRRS yields the CRC. The relation between 
(1+γ))q(IRS)(μ6P+μ6Q)-q2(IBS)μ2 is ambiguous and depends on the parameter 
setting but (q(IBS)-q(IRS))μ4 is always positive since we have q(IBS)>q(IRS). 
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Part (ii): In  part (i) we already illustrated the profit relationship in the ECRs, and 
rearrangement of ESWBS<ESWRS reveals the SWC. Note that 1.5((1-q(IRS))μ4-(1-
q(IBS)μ1) is always positive because (1-q(IBS))<(1-q(IRS)). Besides, 
(1+0.5(1+γ))q(IRS)(μ6P+μ6Q)-1.5q(IBS)μ2 is ambiguous.  
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